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MONTHLY REVIEW ³⁰

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

ASPECTS OF THE BIRMINGHAM CRISIS

VOL. 15

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THE EDITORS

REPORT ON HUNGARY

JOHAN VOGT

THE TONIC OF REVOLUTION

SYBIL H. MAY

A Suggestion to HUAC

LEO HUBERMAN

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The May issue, and especially the Review of the Month on "The Split in the Socialist World," has booked an unusually heavy mail—both pro and con. We are grateful to those who have taken the time and trouble to write, and apologize for not being able to answer all letters personally.

There is lots of activity to report on the MR Press front. First, we are now accepting pre-publication orders for four new books (for prices, see the ad on the back cover):

(1) *Whither Latin America?* a collection of 12 of the best articles on Latin America which have appeared in *MR*, should be off the press about the third week in June and will be immediately mailed to those who have sent in their orders. To allow more time for reviewers, we are postponing publication date to July 17th. Until then, the pre-publication price will hold.

(2) *Politics and Law in South Africa*, by Julius Lewin, Senior Lecturer in African Law and Administration at the University of Witwatersrand. This is a selection of critical essays on the crucial problem of race relations in South Africa by one of that country's leading authorities on the subject.

(3) *A Philosophy of Man*, by Adam Schaff, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw, is a discussion, by one of the leading intellectuals of the socialist world of the "eternal problems" of human happiness, freedom, and responsibility. Owing to unforeseen delays, we are

(continued on inside back cover)

ASPECTS OF THE BIRMINGHAM CRISIS

As we write, the situation in Birmingham is still fluid, and it would be foolish to try to make predictions for even as short a period as between going to press and publication. But there are many aspects of the Birmingham crisis which can be usefully discussed regardless of what happens next. In what follows we touch upon some of them, without making any attempt at a systematic analysis.

The Power of Mass Action

It seems probable that Birmingham marks a turning point in the Negro liberation struggle. It has provided a large-scale, dramatic demonstration of the tremendous power of mass action. From now on the movement will almost certainly develop and improve this weapon and make increasing use of it. If so, the character and tempo of the struggle are about to undergo a significant change.

What is the nature of the power of mass action? It seems to us that it has three major ingredients, all clearly illustrated in Birmingham. First, mass action can inflict serious damage on the economic interests of the dominant class. Second, it can put an intolerable strain on the machinery of government. And third, it can instill fear into the white community generally. Let us consider these three ingredients in turn.

On the first point, the ability of mass action to damage the economic interests of the dominant class, a report from Birmingham by Philip Benjamin in the *New York Times* of May 11th bears eloquent testimony:

Greater Birmingham's retail sales which ordinarily total \$1,000,000,000 a year have been sharply reduced as a result of a long Negro boycott.

Persons close to the situation here say retail sales have been off 30 percent or more. A local businessman said today his retailing acquaintances had told him that for the first time in a generation they had shown a net loss on their books. . . .

Store owners are generally unwilling to discuss with strangers the effects of the racial crisis on their sales. But it is no secret that

a program of "selective shopping"—otherwise known as a boycott—has been going on for more than a year. . . .

A man in business here for thirty-five years said recently that there were more stores for rent in Birmingham last fall than there had been during the Depression. Today, in a single block on Fifth Avenue, eight of 20 store fronts had "for rent" signs in their otherwise empty windows.

Nor is this the only negative economic aspect of the present struggle. Capitalist enterprise, particularly of the giant corporate variety, needs and demands an environment of social stability and civic peace. Where such an environment is lacking, it refuses to invest and may even pull out and move to less disturbed areas.* Whether or not the industrialization of the South has actually been slowed down by the liberation struggle it is impossible to say. But, as any careful reader of the business press knows, the problem has been much discussed and worried over; and it seems hard to believe that further upheavals on the scale of Birmingham could fail to have a serious adverse effect on the rate of investment in the South. This explains an apparent change in the attitudes of many conservative Southern businessmen. As James Reston said in his column in the *New York Times*, also on May 11th: "They may not want racial integration but they want business, and they want the South to benefit from the transforming scientific revolution of the age."

In the second place, mass action in Birmingham clearly showed its ability to clog the courts and fill the jails, thus crippling the normal processes of law enforcement. And this was only the most visible sign of the strain which such a campaign puts on the machinery of government.

The third ingredient of the power of mass action is its capacity to instill fear. This comes through very clearly in the statement issued, after the conclusion of the agreement of May 10th, by Sidney W. Smyer, one of the leading white negotiators:

Our task has not been pleasant or easy. It was undertaken only after thorough deliberation and under the pressure of growing crisis. It is important that the public understand that the steps we have undertaken were necessary to avoid a dangerous and imminent explosion. . . . We were caught in an emergency and forced

* The flight of capital—both foreign and domestic—from Latin America in recent years provides a dramatic illustration.

to act on the frightening information from our law enforcement agencies that a situation had been created which could erupt in a holocaust should a spark be struck. (Quoted by Claude Sitton in the News of the Week section of the *New York Times*, May 12.)

The reader is asked to note well that the power of the liberation movement in Birmingham did not stem from the justice of its cause (except insofar as this propelled the Negro masses into action), the devotion to non-violence of its leaders, its appeals to the famous "American Creed," or any other moral or ideological consideration. It stemmed from the movement's ability to inflict economic damage, to cripple the machinery of government, and to create a threat of uncontrolled violence. Let us hope that this dramatic practical lesson in political science will be carefully studied and learned by the Negro liberation movement in the North and West as well as in the South.

The Location of Political Power

But this is not the only lesson in political science which can be learned from Birmingham. The crisis acted like a bright searchlight illuminating the real power structure not only of Birmingham but of the whole country. Normally, of course, one would expect that negotiations to settle a conflict of this kind would be carried on by duly elected and appointed officials who are supposed to represent the people and to be motivated by the public interest. In this case, however, owing to a dispute between two groups each claiming to be the legal government of Birmingham, this procedure could not be followed. The result was that the real holders of power had to come forward. And who were they? Workers? Ministers? Politicians? Hardly. They were the big employers of Birmingham. According to Sidney Smyer, whom we have already quoted, the white negotiating committee which arranged the settlement "was representative of the employers of perhaps 80 percent of the working force of Birmingham." But these people, customarily referred to in the Northern press as "moderates," were not exactly operating on their own. James Reston is authority for the following information:

Moderate opinion was organized. Roger Blough of U.S. Steel got in touch with the moderates of his vast steel enterprises in

Birmingham and appealed for compromise. The leaders of the big chain stores with branches in Birmingham did the same. ("Washington" column, *New York Times*, May 12.)

Here we get a fascinating glimpse of what is usually carefully kept behind the scenes—the giant corporate empires transmitting their wishes from the center where decisions are made to the outlying provinces where they are carried out. Nor was this their first intervention in the affairs of Birmingham. Another well-informed Washington columnist, Joseph Alsop, tells the story of how a new city administration was recently elected there (owing to a court fight, as noted above, it has not yet been able to take office). After recording the fact that some eighteen months ago the Department of Justice in Washington warned that Birmingham was likely to be the scene of racial upheavals, Alsop continues:

Leaders of Birmingham's business community were already thinking that something had better be done about the problem. Their impulse seems to have been strengthened by the warning from the Justice Department to key persons in the Birmingham white community and to other persons with leverage in the city like the national executives of chain department stores doing business there, and of the Scripps-Howard and Newhouse organizations which own the city's papers.

The result was a citizens' movement to oust the ultra-segregationist city government controlled by Police Commissioner Gene "Bull" Connor. With the help of some Negro votes—for local leaders of the Negro community had already staged a registration drive—the moderate, Albert Boutwell, was elected to the mayoralty. (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 13.)

What seems to be happening in Birmingham, and no doubt elsewhere in the South, is that the real powers that be in the United States, having long found it in their interests to allow the white supremacist Southern oligarchy to enjoy a monopoly of political power in the region, are now moving cautiously to replace this traditional oligarchy with "moderates." The reason is simple: with Negroes not only demanding their rights but fighting for them on a mass scale, the old order in the South is no longer compatible with the requirements of orderly profit-making.

The Pattern of the Birmingham Struggle

The struggle in Birmingham has so far gone through two quite distinct phases. In the first, leading up to the negotiated agreement of May 10th, the main actors were the Negro leaders, about whom more will be said presently, and the several thousand children and adults who marched and filled the jails. By all accounts, these demonstrators were from the better-off segment of the Negro population—church-goers, cleanly dressed, believers in the doctrine of non-violence. These are the people who could expect to benefit most directly from the kind of agreement which was reached on the 10th—from the desegregation of eating places in the stores and even more from the opening up of new jobs as clerks and salespeople.

The second phase was the battle of the night of May 11-12. The Negroes in this battle were an entirely different group. Stan Opatowsky, in a report to the *New York Post* (May 13), has given a moving account of who they were and why they fought:

They were *not* the fresh-faced youngsters who paraded so solemnly for justice last week.

They were not those parents who stood proudly by as they saw their children off to jail.

No, instead they are Birmingham's dispossessed, and the truth is that they will remain non-privileged even when the new day dawns.

Their scant education and few skills leave them only the poorest of the jobs Birmingham has for Negroes. They will not benefit from Birmingham's new deal because they will never be qualified, or acceptable, for jobs as clerks or salesmen.

They have known only two kinds of white men—the boss and the cop. The boss is none too good. He hires them for their menial tasks by the day and lays them off at whim.

But the cop is much worse. The cop accosts them at any hour and arrests them on any pretext.

In every town there's gossip of what cops do in the back room. There was no need for a back room in Birmingham. The cops often beat Negroes senseless in full public view on the street.

The steam has been building in these people for weeks. It was they, not the demonstrating children, who were targets of hoses and dogs. . . .

Some of their buddies went to jail. They are still there. No benefactor put up bail for them as he did for the children.

So the hate built in these bitter souls and the courage built

up too. They had always cowered before the cops and held back their hatred—to protect their skulls.

But suddenly, without forewarning, for they had been in no church rallies and ridden in no freedom rides, they saw Negroes defying the hated cop.

So the non-privileged decided to make it a fight of their own. . . .

From all accounts of the battle that we have seen, it emerges very clearly that it began as a spontaneous reaction to the bombing by white supremacists of a Negro-owned motel and the house of Martin Luther King's brother. There was no leadership and no stated objectives in the sense that the first phase of the struggle had objectives. And yet it was by no means mere wanton and aimless violence. On the contrary, it had a very specific target—the police. Opatowsky's dispatch indicates the reason for this, but the matter is so important to an understanding of what is happening in the South that it may be as well to quote from two more general accounts of the role of the police in the Southern system. Here is the way it is described in Myrdal's highly regarded treatise on the U.S. Negro problem:

In the policeman's relation to the Negro population in the South, there are several singularities to be observed, all of which have to be explained in the historical setting. . . . One is that he stands not only for civic order as defined in formal laws and regulations, but also for "white supremacy" and the whole set of social customs associated with this concept. In the traditions of the region a break of the caste rules against one white person is conceived of as an aggression against white society and, indeed, as a potential threat to every other white individual. It is demanded that even minor transgressions of caste etiquette should be punished, and the policeman is delegated to carry out this function. Because of this sanction from the police, the caste order of the South, and even the local variations of social custom, become extensions of the law. (Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 1963 edition, p. 535.)

And here—as described by James M. Nabrit, Jr., President of Howard University, to *Herald Tribune* reporter Robert S. Bird—is the way it looks to Negroes. After remarking that the image which many people have of America is very different from that of Negroes in the South, Dr. Nabrit proceeds:

Their image is fear, and bodily harm, and economic boycotts,

and intimidation of all kinds. These are with the Negro every day. . . .

I have lived in the South. There the Sheriff is the man. I don't care what people write in books, it's the Sheriff who has contact with the jury list, with the taxes and assessments, and all the legal and illegal activities going on in the county. He can make a person's life miserable by harassment—I mean white or black.

Only a few white people in the county can do anything with him, and they work hand in glove with him. So to the Negro in these counties the image of America is the image of the Sheriff. . . .

But the importance that this Southern Negro sees in the elections in the United States is not who is elected President, all he wants to know is who is going to be Sheriff. That's the person who is going to be on his back. I'm not talking about Negroes in the universities, I'm talking about the ordinary Negro whose life is just one risk after another. (Second of a series entitled "Ten Negroes," by Robert S. Bird, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 5, 1963.)

Against this background it can be seen that the mass attack by the most exploited and submerged Negroes on the police force of Birmingham was, in a very real sense, a revolutionary act, at once a repudiation of the whole Southern system personified by the cop and a sort of declaration of independence. Nor was its deeper meaning apparently lost on the Birmingham authorities. There was a time, not so long ago, when a much less aggressive display on the part of Negroes would have been met by a massacre or, at the very least, exemplary lynchings. The fact that these methods were not resorted to is certainly not to be attributed to any change of heart on the part of Birmingham officialdom but to fear. In Birmingham, Negroes will never again be cowed as they have been so long: they have served notice that when provoked they will fight back. And when more than a third of a community's population closes ranks and fights back, it is indeed a force to be feared.

The Next Steps

Obviously the present situation in Birmingham is completely unstable and cannot last long.

One seeming possibility would be the imposition by die-hard segregationists, who still control the state and city governments, of a South African-type regime of repression and terror.

The behavior of the state troopers sent into the city by the Governor, and indeed their continued presence there long after the battle of May 11-12, can only be interpreted as an effort to provoke Negroes and thus provide "justification" for a reign of terror. No doubt there are many who are itching to follow this course, and from all we know of the Southern oligarchy it would seem quite logical to expect them to be given a green light. Nevertheless, it is safe to rule out this possibility, for the simple reason that in the present world situation the national ruling class of this country cannot afford to allow a South Africa to develop in its own backyard. Kennedy's action in sending troops to Alabama right after the Saturday night battle was certainly intended to remind the die-hards of this fact of 20th-century life.

The only other possibility is a policy of concessions to the liberation movement—desegregation of public facilities, easing of discriminatory hiring practices, and so on. The agreement of May 10th was a small beginning in this direction. It was, however, promptly repudiated by city and state governments, and even the newly elected Boutwell administration which may be taking control of City Hall in the near future disclaimed any responsibility for the agreement. Presumably the political situation in Alabama is such that no elected official wants or dares to take part in the accommodation to the demands of the liberation movement which is required for the attainment of a reasonable degree of socio-economic stability. Under these circumstances, it appears that a change in the political situation must precede, or at least proceed in step with, the policy of accommodation. And such a political change can only be the result of enfranchisement of a significantly large body of Negro voters. It is therefore here that the struggle is likely to center in the near future.

The prospects for progress appear to be favorable. It should not be difficult to channel the new militancy of the oppressed Negro masses into a voter registration drive. As already indicated, their most deeply felt grievances are against the police; and many studies have shown that where Negroes have the vote, their treatment by the police (and other departments of local government) tends to be much less brutal and discriminatory

than where they do not have the vote. On the other side, the need of the dominant economic interests of the South for civic peace and the impossibility of getting it under present conditions should lead them now for the first time to take a positive attitude toward the extension of the franchise to Negroes. This could be directly reflected in the attitude of registrars in some localities, and it certainly ought to embolden the federal authorities to take a stronger stand toward enforcing the constitutional right to vote. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it is going to be harder from now on for registrars to trick or bully Negroes out of their right to vote. Solidarity and militancy bring their rewards in all fields of social existence.

How Much Advance?

If our analysis is sound, the period ahead should see a rapid broadening and deepening of the liberation movement throughout the South, with consequent important gains. So we must ask: what will determine the extent of these gains?

There are unquestionably many factors involved here, but one in particular seems to us to demand special attention, the character of the leadership of the Negro liberation movement.

It appears from published sources that the leadership of the movement is drawn overwhelmingly from the Negro middle and upper classes. (The white element, which used to be important in the NAACP, seems hardly to count any more.) Martin Luther King and his closest associates are, of course, ministers; and the kind of people who support them and work with them in local situations is probably accurately indicated in the make-up of the committee which represented the Negro side in the negotiations leading up to the Birmingham agreement of May 10th. The local members of that committee, according to the *New York Times* of May 11th, were John J. Drew, an executive of a Negro insurance company (in whose "brick-and-frame ranch-style home" some of the negotiating sessions were held); L. H. Pitts, president of Miles College, a Negro college in Birmingham; the Rev. Harold Long; Arthur D. Shores, a lawyer; and A. G. Gaston, a businessman. This group could well be as representative of the black bourgeoisie of Birmingham as its white counterpart was of the white bourgeoisie (employers

of 80 percent of the working force, it will be recalled). And it seems clear that working people were as completely excluded on the one side as on the other.

The question we are asking can now be rephrased: How far can Negro bourgeois leadership be expected to go in pressing demands on the dominant white ruling class? In answering, two considerations have to be kept in mind. On the one hand, the Negro bourgeoisie is certainly passionately interested in ending the system of segregation and discrimination which exists in the South, and only to a lesser degree in the North and West as well. On the other hand, the Negro bourgeoisie has a very strong vested interest in preserving the basic features of the existing social order, *including* the effective separation of the races. The reason for this is that if all barriers between the races were eliminated, the Negro bourgeoisie would find itself subjected to disastrous competition. Many businessmen would go broke, professionals would lose a large part of their clientele, teachers would either be downgraded or lose their jobs. These things would happen, not of course because Negroes are naturally inferior to whites but because they have less capital, poorer training, more limited experience, and so on.

The Negro bourgeoisie thus wants two things: equality and continued separation. A moment's reflection will show, however, that the two are contradictory. Real equality means legal equality plus economic equality plus social equality. Anything else is simply not equality. But if full equality in this sense were achieved the walls separating the races would plainly disappear. It follows that the attitude of the Negro bourgeoisie toward equality cannot but be ambivalent: they want it and yet they don't want it. And this ambivalence is bound to be reflected in the way the Negro bourgeois leadership conceives of the objectives and methods of the liberation movement.

In practice what happens seems to be this: The leadership demands and is prepared to fight for strict legal equality. This is a thoroughly respectable goal: it is enshrined in the Constitution and is supported by the more far-sighted elements of the white ruling class. Moreover, its realization would permit the Negro with money to lead a life not too different from that of his white counterpart in the class structure, without in any way

changing or threatening that structure itself. But an all-out attack on economic and social inequality (the two are indissolubly linked) would demand precisely such a challenge to the class structure. The reasons for this are complex and cannot be analyzed here: it will have to suffice to say that with the exception of the very small bourgeoisie, the Negro people are at the bottom of the class structure and it is to the interest of the white ruling class to keep them there. The position of Negroes is therefore an integral part of the class structure, and neither their position nor the class structure can be changed without changing the other.

What is crucial for our present purposes is that the extreme poverty of the Negro masses which results from their submerged position in the class structure is by itself, and without any special system of legal oppression such as exists in the South, sufficient to enforce the ghettoization of Negroes and hence their effective separation as a race. But it is precisely this separation which provides a base and *raison d'être* for the Negro bourgeoisie. It follows that the Negro bourgeoisie does not want to change the class structure but rather wants only such reforms as will leave it essentially intact.

This explains, we think, why in the economic field the program of the liberation movement is limited to minor palliatives—chiefly opening up some new lines of employment to Negroes, reducing the severity of discrimination in areas where both Negroes and whites are customarily employed, and enlarging the number of government jobs available to Negroes. Such palliatives were always totally inadequate to the needs of the Negro masses, and today whatever small gains they may achieve are being swamped by the wholesale elimination, through automation, of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs of the kind that have always provided the bulk of Negro employment.

The answer to the question raised at the outset of this section, then, is that the gains likely to be achieved by the liberation movement in the near future will be almost entirely limited to the legal field. Economically, the condition of the Negro masses will continue to deteriorate, possibly absolutely, certainly relative to the condition of the white population. One single set of statistics paints the grim picture. In 1940, before

the boom associated with the Second World War had really got started, unemployment was 13 percent of the white labor force and 14.5 percent of the nonwhite. In 1962 the corresponding figures were 4.9 percent for whites and 11 percent for nonwhites. In other words, while Negro unemployment was 12 percent greater than white in 1940, it was 125 percent greater in 1962: the differential had grown tenfold. The bourgeois leadership of the liberation movement has no program for coping with this disastrous economic trend. Worse still, its own interests generate no strong incentive for it to develop such a program.

A Movement Headed for Crisis

As a result of the breakthrough in Birmingham, the Negro liberation movement now seems to be approaching its greatest victories. The old order in the South is losing its usefulness to the powers that be. It has to be changed and it will be changed. This is a tremendous achievement of the liberation movement for which one can express only profound admiration and gratitude.

At the same time, however, it is necessary to sound a note of warning, even of alarm. The defeat of the Southern oligarchy will not solve all the Negroes' problems. It will only mean that the South will get more and more like the North. And the problems of Negroes in the North—extreme poverty, ghettoization, unemployment—are getting steadily worse, not better.

As we have seen, the liberation movement has no meaningful proposals for dealing with these problems, and its present leadership cannot be expected to make a serious effort to make good this lack. The conclusion can therefore hardly be avoided that the liberation movement is headed for a crisis—a crisis which every victory in the South brings closer.

Indications of what is to come are already apparent, especially in the growth in numbers and influence of the Black Muslims. Black Muslimism is so far largely a Northern and Western movement. It must be considered to be the product of two forces: the deteriorating status of the Negro in these regions, and the utter inability of the old-line Negro organizations to propose a program for reversing this trend. As the South approaches the North and it becomes clear to Southern Negroes that they

too are caught in the grip of malignant economic forces, the Black Muslims will in all likelihood spread in strength to that region also.

Now, we want to make perfectly clear that we are not joining the fashionable liberal chorus of deploring and denouncing the Black Muslims. The rise of the movement is a healthy sign that Negroes everywhere are throwing off attitudes of resignation and apathy; most of what the Black Muslims say about Negro-white relations in this country is absolutely true; the movement has brought dignity and self-respect to tens of thousands of victims of inhuman oppression. But for all these positive aspects and accomplishments, it remains true that the social, economic, and political doctrines of the Muslims are extremely confused and their nationalistic solution of the American Negro problem—a separate Negro nation to be established on territory turned over to them by the United States—is hopelessly utopian. Many individual Negroes may find a form of earthly salvation through Black Muslimism; as a group, and especially as the great majority of the country's lowest social class, Negroes can expect little from it.

The liberation movement as at present constituted is accomplishing a great task in smashing the old order in the South; Muslimism is also accomplishing a great task in teaching Negroes how to respect themselves as human beings. But neither understands the forces which are holding Negroes at the bottom of the social order and pushing them ever lower. And neither can therefore propose a course of action which holds out a promise to the Negro people of genuine liberation and genuine self-realization.

If we are right, what the Negroes of this country need is a new movement which, taking the best features of the liberation movement and Black Muslimism, adds fresh ideas and a genuinely *radical* approach to the existing social order. It cannot come too soon.

ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO PRINT

The *New York Times* of April 19th carried a small item buried in the depths of page 18, which we reproduce in full:

**Taylor Indicates Indians
Started Clash With Chinese**

WASHINGTON, April 18 (UPI)—Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in secret Congressional testimony made public today that India might have started the border fight with Communist China.

The previously accepted version of the border fighting that flared last fall was that Communist China had attacked Indian troops.

General Taylor's statement was made Feb. 14 in testimony before the chairmanship of Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas. The general was questioned by Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida.

"Let me talk about the Red China and the Indian operation," Mr. Sikes said. "Did the Indians actually start this military operation?"

"They were edging forward in the disputed area," replied General Taylor. "Yes sir."

At this point the testimony was censored out of the public transcript.

So the United States government knew all the time that all the stories about Chinese aggression against India were lies. And if the government knew it, it is impossible to believe that the press didn't know it also. No doubt this explains why the truth, casually revealed in the course of a Congressional hearing, is now buried in the back of the paper instead of being blazoned on the front page as one of the most important news stories of

the year. You see, it wasn't news at all to the editorial fraternity—they only neglected to print it at a time when the truth would have exposed the vile hypocrisy and evil intent of India's ruling class and its ardent backers in the West. Now they print it where hardly anyone will see it and after the lies of the past have already acquired the character of axiomatic truths.

There is a lesson in this which cannot be repeated too often or learned too well: Never believe what the capitalist press says about the great issues of the time. Its concern is not to tell the truth but to protect and glorify the system of exploitation and privilege which brings wealth to the few and misery to the many. He who has grasped this fact has taken the first step toward understanding the world as it really is. And he who understands the world—how can he refuse to join the struggle to change it?

(May 15, 1963)

We regard the struggle against color discrimination and for the pursuit of freedom and happiness as the highest aspiration of all men. Through bitter experience, we have learned to regard the white man as a harsh and merciless type of human being whose contempt for our rights, and whose utter indifference to the promotion of our welfare, makes his assurances to us absolutely meaningless and hypocritical.

The white man makes all the laws; he charges us before his courts and accuses us, and he sits in judgment over us.

Men are not capable of doing nothing, of saying nothing, of not reacting to injustice, of not protesting against oppression, of not striving for the good society and the good life in the ways they see it.

—Nelson Mandela, in his defense during his trial in South Africa, quoted in the *Observer*, November 18, 1962.

THE TONIC OF REVOLUTION

BY SYBIL H. MAY

For a long time the poets have been telling us in their vague language that

Hope springs eternal in the human breast
Man never is but to be blest.

Now come the social psychologists with their surveying instruments to test out the poet's assertion, to give us an exact measure of the hope, and to compare its quality in different human breasts.

One of these surveyors, Hadley Cantril, describes in the February, 1963, issue of *Scientific American* a work in progress, "A Study of Aspirations," which he and his colleagues at the Institute for International Social Research in Princeton, New Jersey, initiated a few years ago.* Their purpose is to "study the hopes and fears of people in different countries and to find out where each man thinks he stands in his own world." So far, they have surveyed "representative samples of the adult population, usually 2000 individuals, in the United States, West Germany, Brazil, Cuba, the Philippines, Israel, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Surveys are under way in Poland, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, and India."

How do these scientists go about their task of measuring intangible hopes and fears? What techniques do they use with the "representative sample" who agree to cooperate in their study?

The first thing the surveyors had to do was to work out the main questions they would put to the people they were to interview (called subjects or respondents). They had also to devise a scale which would enable them to make their measure-

Sybil H. May is an editorial assistant to the editors of *MR* and Executive Secretary of Monthly Review Associates.

* The following summary and the accompanying charts are published with the permission of *Scientific American*. The interpretation of the charts is the joint product of Sybil May and the editors of *MR*.

THE TONIC OF REVOLUTION

ments and comparisons. And of course they had to select their representative samples. Provided with these instruments, the interviewers (wherever possible citizens of the country to be studied) set out to collect their data.

Here is Mr. Cantril's description of their procedure:

In an interview the respondent is first of all asked the following question: "All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in your own life, what are your wishes and hopes for the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like then, if you are to be happy? Take your time in answering; such things aren't easy to put into words."

The interviewer records the reply in as verbatim a fashion as possible. When the respondent falters, the interviewer may prompt him with questions, being careful not to ask leading questions, until there is nothing further to report. The interviewer then continues with this question: "Now, taking the other side of the picture, what are your fears and worries about the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the worst possible light, what would your life look like then? Again, take your time in answering."

Again the responses are recorded verbatim with whatever prompting is necessary. The interviewer then shows the respondent a drawing of a ladder with 10 rungs and says: "Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you. Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?"


As he speaks the interviewer points to the top of the ladder and then to the bottom, and when he comes to the question of where the respondent now stands on the ladder he moves his finger rapidly up and down it. When the respondent has indicated the appropriate rung, he is asked: "Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?" Then he is asked: "Where do you think you will stand on the ladder five years from now?"

After he has told the interviewer where he thinks he stands in his own world, the subject is requested to place his country somewhere on the ladder. The top rung represents the best possible life for his country, the bottom rung the worst. Where does he place his country today? Five years ago? Where will it be five years from now?

Having adopted a procedure that permits "richness, uniqueness and variety of individual response," the surveyors' next step—"perhaps the most crucial one"—was to work out the coding of these responses. In order to do this they set up 145

categories into one of which each answer could be fitted, thus making it possible to compare different social and national groups. For instance, one category is "Improvement of present standard of living for self and family," another is "Self-Development or Improvement—opportunity for independence of thought and action, for following through with own interests; further study; reading for non-leisure purposes; no 'rut.'" They found that the 145 categories cover most responses and not more than 5 percent of all topics mentioned had to be lumped under "Miscellaneous."

Lastly, the coded results, together with the coded ladder ratings, were transformed to punched cards for tabulation and statistical treatment. This process has been completed for the following five countries: the United States, West Germany, Brazil, Cuba, and the Philippines.



The bars indicate the average responses to questions on where "you personally stand at the present time" (lattice), where "you stood five years ago" (black) and "will stand five years from now" (dotted). Numbers at ends of bars show increments from past to present and present to future.


As you study the charts which summarize the survey's findings, keep in mind the dates when the basic interview material was gathered: the United States, August 1959; Cuba,

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spring 1960 (more than a year after Fidel Castro came to power); West Germany, September 1957; Philippines, spring 1959; Brazil, spring 1961. In what follows, these dates are "now," and they provide the benchmarks from which "five years ago" and "five years from now" are measured.

Chart 1 shows personal ratings for all five countries. Cubans feel that they have gained most of all in the last five years, and they expect about the same rate of improvement to be maintained during the next half decade. The only other significant improvement in the recent past has been experienced by the West Germans (1952-1957 were the years of the "economic miracle"), and they too expect about the same rate of gain to be maintained. Americans, Filipinos, and Brazilians, have had disappointing recent experiences, but they are hopeful of the future and the Brazilians most of all.


Chart 2 showing national ratings is even more striking. Cubans feel that their country was really in the doghouse five years ago, that there has been a spectacular gain in the mean-



As in the preceding chart, the three bars represent (from top to bottom) the past, present and future ratings. The ends of the ladder were assumed to be "your greatest hopes" and "worst fears" for the nation.


while, and that in five more years their country will be almost on the next-to-top rung of the ladder. Americans see relatively little change in the recent past or near future. Filipinos believe that their country has been going downhill and expect no more than recovery of lost ground. Brazilians see little change in the last five years but once again have extraordinarily high hopes for the future.

Chart 3 shows Cuba, both personal and national, broken down by economic groups. It is of course quite possible that a survey today, after the Second Cuban Revolution, would yield different results. This has to be borne in mind, but it does not in the least detract from the interest of the actual results of the 1960 survey. These show that *all* economic groups feel that they personally have benefited in the recent past and expect to go on benefiting. All groups also feel that the same is true of their country only much more so. As between groups, we find



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CHART 4



DIFFERENT OUTLOOKS of various social and economic subpopulations in each country are reflected in their differing personal and national ratings, such as those shown here. Again the bars represent average ratings for past (black), present (latticed) and future (dotted).

the expected variation from higher to lower. The improvement in the sense of well-being in the lowest economic group is nothing short of spectacular: in the last five years they feel that their country has climbed up five rungs of the ladder, and in five more years they expect it to be reaching for the top!

Chart 4 contains an eloquent commentary on the most explosive question facing the United States today. The personal and national ratings tell much the same story: whites see some improvement in the last five years and expect somewhat more in the next half decade. Negroes, on the other hand, feel that the last five years have been a period of retrogression both for themselves and for the country. On the other hand, their expectations for the next five years are somewhat more optimistic than those of whites.

How shall we interpret these charts? There are no simple answers, and Mr. Cantril wisely refrains from attempting to provide them. And yet his results do seem to point to certain conclusions, in some cases strongly, in others more tentatively.

Here are a few. Do you agree or disagree? What further explanations and meanings occur to you?

(1) The case of Cuba suggests that there is nothing like a real revolution to improve a people's sense of well-being and its confidence in the future.

(2) Sustained prosperity, as in West Germany during the 1950's, has a similar though less marked effect.

(3) Underdeveloped countries which have not had a revolution (Brazil and the Philippines) feel frustrated but hopeful about the future. The combination, it would seem, could well be a potent force making for revolution.

(4) The feelings of United States Negroes are remarkably like those of Filipinos and Brazilians. The same corollary would seem to follow.

(5) Americans in general (with whites of course in the vast majority) feel that their country has advanced hardly at all in the last five years and do not expect it will do too well in the next five. On the other hand, they feel that personally they are considerably better off than they were and expect the rate of improvement to increase substantially. This capacity to separate individual from national fortunes seems to be much stronger among Americans than among other peoples surveyed. Does it perhaps signify that Americans no longer take seriously the traditional ethical justification of individualism, the doctrine that what is good for the individual is *ipso facto* good for society? If so, one may well wonder what possible justification they do see for the "American Way of Life."

MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN

In this atmosphere of indolent contentment the privileged classes, and especially the urban middle class, came to find their ideals in pleasure, the pursuit of gain, and the attainment, for themselves and their families, of the material advantages of civilization. Men grew selfish and fixed their hearts on idleness and amusement. In such an era of sterility and stagnation the best minds grew dissatisfied with life and found fault with it; and when they found that this led to nothing, they lost faith in the power of reason—reason which failed them on every hand, while all the while the guardianship and censorship of the ruler was gaining ground.

—Michael Rostovtzeff, *Rome* (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 322.

A SUGGESTION TO HUAC

BY LEO HUBERMAN

Following the announcement of the service of subpoenas for May 6, 1963, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities allegedly investigating "illegal travel to Cuba and pro-Castro propaganda," the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee ran a public protest meeting at the Burlington Hotel on May 5. Among those subpoenaed was Leo Huberman, co-editor of MR. His speech at the meeting is printed below.—The Editors

I have long been on record as opposed to the investigations conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee. Its inquiries are obviously designed to suppress dissent and induce conformity among those individuals who, like myself, are dissenters and non-conformists. It is our right and obligation to dissent where the House Un-American Activities Committee, in its harassment of us is, in our opinion, violating our Constitutional rights. With hundreds of distinguished Americans of all political beliefs, I signed an advertisement in the *New York Times* on February 22, 1962, appealing to the House of Representatives to abolish HUAC. So long as HUAC pursues its present policies I shall continue to oppose it as I have in the past.

The Committee's current subpoena, its intention to question me about my activities in respect to Cuba, has led me to conceive of a new role for HUAC—one better suited to its members' responsibility to legislate in behalf of the best interests of the people of the United States. I suggest that HUAC in the future, instead of concerning itself with the harassment of dissenters, examine carefully the viewpoints of those dissenters and bring their thoughts to the attention of the members of Congress. Had HUAC done this, had the Committee members faithfully reported to their Congressional colleagues and to the Executive branch of government my observations on Cuba, and had the Congress and the President been guided by those observations, then relations between the United States and Cuba would not be the sorry mess they are today.

A specific example will serve to illustrate the point. It is generally agreed that the Bay of Pigs invasion was a disaster, perhaps the worst defeat in United States history. Yet the members of this Committee, which subscribes to the magazine MONTHLY REVIEW edited by Paul Sweezy and myself, were in a position to advise the Congress and the President not to initiate that disastrous invasion. For in the July 1960 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, nine months before the invasion was launched, Sweezy and I warned, on page 172: "No expeditionary force of Batsitanos or Latin American mercenaries, no matter how lavishly financed and equipped, would stand a chance against the Cuban army and the Cuban people."

In the soul-searching that followed the Bay of Pigs fiasco, many Congressmen were puzzled by the fact that the Cuban masses did not greet the invaders with open arms and turn against Fidel Castro and the revolutionary government. Weren't the Cuban people angry about the loss of freedom? Weren't they concerned about Communism in Cuba? If the members of HUAC, at that time, had been acting along the lines I am proposing, they could have supplied the answers to their fellow law-makers—the answers were suggested in a talk I gave to the Monthly Review Associates on May 22, 1961, reported in the June issue of the magazine, on page 68:

I do not, for one moment, minimize the value of free elections, free speech, and free press. These are valuable, essential liberties, of the utmost importance to people who have enough to eat, decent housing, education, and medical care. But they are not of particular urgency to hungry, uneducated, diseased, exploited people. When those of us with full bellies tell the people with empty bellies that what they need most in the world is free elections, they will not listen; they know better, they know that what they need first and foremost is bread, shoes, a school for their children, medical care, adequate clothing, a decent home. All these necessities of life, plus the dignity that goes with their enjoyment, are what the Cuban masses are now getting for the first time in their history. That is why, to the amazement of those who have never been hungry in their lives, they do not cower before the epithet "Communism," but respond with the slogan "Patria o Muerte."

The revolution in Cuba is important not only in itself but as the forerunner of profound social change to come in the rest

of Latin America. This is obvious, not only to the dissenters, but to the top policy-makers in the United States. All thinking people today, whether they are of the Right or of the Left, are concerned with the problem of the underdeveloped countries whose hungry people, the world over, no longer accept their lot as a decree of fate. In his message to Congress on Latin American aid on March 14, 1961, President Kennedy stated the problem in these words: "Poverty, illiteracy, hopelessness and a sense of injustice—the conditions which breed political and social unrest—are almost universal in the Latin American countryside."

The President cited telling statistics to prove the point, and he presented his "Alliance for Progress" aid program designed to bring about the necessary reforms—"improved land use, education, health, housing, higher and more diversified agricultural production, better distribution of wealth and income, and wider sharing in the process of development."

The Congress adopted the Alliance for Progress program and voted billions of dollars to make it work. Yet today, two years later, it is apparent to everyone that the Alliance for Progress plan is not working. The necessary reforms, accurately described by the President and approved by the Congress, have not been achieved—with one exception. Where? In Cuba. Only in Cuba has every one of the changes that had to be made, been made.

This is a startling fact—and in the light of this country's stake in Latin America, it is a fact of tremendous importance. HUAC, had it pursued the policy I have suggested, would have been in a position to be of service to its colleagues in Congress. The Committee members could have explained to Congressmen why the hated Revolution in Cuba, not the favored Alliance for Progress reform program, is doing the job that needs to be done. They had only to refer their colleagues to my article "Which Way for Latin America?" in the March 1961 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.

The members of HUAC could have done even more for their fellow law-makers. They could have pointed to a program I outlined in the June 1961 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, which suggests a practical way out of the difficulties this country finds

itself in with regard to Cuba. Since that program is still a useful one, I quote it, with the accompanying remarks I made at that time:

There is no easy solution for the mess this country is in concerning Cuba and Latin America. Revolutions are coming in the Latin American countries, and the best hope for U.S. monopoly capitalism is to hang on for as long as possible. With that as a premise, I would propose the following as the most sensible solution to the problem: Go back to the Good Neighbor Policy. Do what Madison Avenue calls "changing the image," by taking four concrete steps in respect to Cuba:

(1) Sit down with Fidel Castro and talk things over as one sovereign nation to another. It was President Kennedy who said so wisely in his Inaugural Address: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

(2) Ask Fidel to restore the Revolutionary Government's original proposal of paying for confiscated property, with 20-year bonds paying $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent interest. Offer to provide Castro with the money to pay for these bonds, by making a long-term loan at a low rate of interest.

(3) Return Guantanamo to Cuba. Since the U.S. doesn't really need the base any more, this magnanimous gesture would cost nothing and gain a great deal.

(4) The U.S. fears Cuba's dependence on the socialist-bloc countries. Let Washington end that dependence by restoring unlimited trade as before. With a large permanent pool of unemployed in our country, the recovery of hundreds of millions of dollars of business each year would help us, and it would certainly make things easier for Cuba.

This program would not bring back "the good old days"—but nothing will. It is predicated on U.S. willingness to cut its losses in Cuba for the sake of holding on longer in Latin America. That's as much as the monopoly capitalists can expect to do now. Someone has said that the U.S. must change its policy "to capture the minds and hearts of people everywhere." My proposal would do that in Latin America as nothing else will.

It is true that it would be difficult to get the American people to support an about-face proposal like this one, in their present frame of mind. But they have been drilled into conformity to Washington's present insane foreign policy; and by using the press, radio, and TV just as skillfully, they could be drilled into conformity in the other direction. It would take time, but it could be

done. As a matter of fact, a surprisingly large number of quite influential Americans are already expressing their doubts about the wisdom of another armed invasion of Cuba.

One thing is certain: Planes and guns won't solve the problem of Cuba and Latin America, and they will bring disaster and shame to our country. It is time for the United States to return to the principles on which it was founded. It is time for the United States to begin to practice the democracy it preaches.

To be subpoenaed for questioning by HUAC, because of the advocacy of a sane Cuban policy, is discouraging, of course. But we do not remain discouraged. Because we know that, if the world survives, then the ideas for which we have fought will one day prevail in the free, rational, civilized society to come. The analyses we print in MONTHLY REVIEW, so abhorrent to the press today, will be page one features—in the journals of tomorrow. If you think this can never happen, I ask you to reflect on an incident in history which indicates that it does happen.

Consider the headlines in the Paris newspapers, from March 9 to March 22, 1815. They were faithfully reporting the journey of Napoleon, across France, on his return from Elba. His progress was described as follows:

March 9
THE ANTHROPOPHAGUS HAS QUITTED HIS DEN

March 10
THE CORSICAN OGRE HAS LANDED AT CAPE JUAN

March 11
THE TIGER HAS ARRIVED AT CAP

March 12
THE MONSTER SLEPT AT GRENOBLE

March 13
THE TYRANT HAS PASSED THROUGH LYONS

March 14
THE USURPER IS DIRECTING HIS STEPS TOWARD DIJON

March 18
BONAPARTE IS ONLY SIXTY LEAGUES FROM THE CAPITAL
He has been fortunate enough to escape his pursuers

March 19
BONAPARTE IS ADVANCING WITH RAPID STEPS, BUT HE WILL
NEVER ENTER PARIS

March 20

NAPOLEON WILL, TOMORROW, BE UNDER OUR RAMPARTS

March 21

THE EMPEROR IS AT FONTAINEBLEAU

March 22

HIS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL MAJESTY

arrived yesterday evening at the Tuileries, amid the joyful acclamations of his devoted and faithful subjects.

(On Tuesday, May 7, Leo Huberman was called to testify. He answered all the questions put to him in the brief session. As we go to press we do not have a copy of the full transcript, but we print below a few of the questions and answers. Since they are recorded from memory alone, the wording is *not* exact. We print them merely to give the flavor of what transpired at the hearing.)

Q. In January 1961, the State Department imposed a ban on travel to Cuba. You were there in April, after the ban was imposed. Did you have validation of your passport, from the State Department, to make the trip?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Have you your passport here to prove it?

A. No, but here is a photostatic copy of the page showing the validation. (Copy reads: "This passport is valid for travel to or in Cuba." It is dated March 29, 1961, and is signed by Frances Knight, Director Passport Office.)

Q. I show you a list of articles on Cuba which appeared in MONTHLY REVIEW from 1960 to 1963. Is this list correct?

A. It is correct as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. We have printed many more articles on Cuba.

Q. Were you asked by the Cuban government to print those articles?

A. We were not. We ran those articles because we have long been interested in the problem of how to get rid of the evils of poverty, unemployment, disease, illiteracy, bad housing, and an unbalanced economy which plague the underdeveloped countries. Cuba had a revolution and solved the problem. In the other Latin American countries the evils continue to exist.

A SUGGESTION TO HUAC

There is only one underdeveloped Latin American country which has solved the problem and that is Cuba.

Q. Are you advocating a Communist take-over in the countries of Latin America?

A. I didn't say that—you did. I said that the evils to which I have referred are major problems for all underdeveloped countries, including Latin America and that, in my opinion, only a revolution along the lines of that led by Fidel Castro in Cuba will solve the problem for Latin America.

Incidentally, I might add that I was advocating such a revolution for Latin America when Fidel Castro was only about 10 years old.

Q. Are you a propagandist for the Communist government of Cuba?

A. I am not a propagandist for the Cuban government, or any other government, or any party, or any organization. But I am, indeed, a propagandist—I am a propagandist for the truth as I see it.

It could probably be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly native American criminal class except Congress.

—Mark Twain

Freedom can not effectively exist where it is understood to mean no more than the toleration of occasional differences about matters which are of small importance.

—Bertrand Russell

No one would deny that we need vigorous law enforcement. But should this entail, for example, the use of terror evoked by the threat of setting beasts against human beings?

I refer, of course, to the use of police dogs. Although I am not aware that this has reduced the crime rate, the police assert that it is effective. Assume for the moment that it is. A full-scale reign of terror might be effective, too.

But could we respect ourselves if we instituted one? Can we pretend that resort to such tactics will foster respect for the law and not merely respect for brute force?

—David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

REPORT ON HUNGARY

BY JOHAN VOGT

The following article, published with the permission of the author who is Professor of Economics at the University of Oslo, was originally a memorandum to the Norwegian foreign minister written in August 1962 after the author's return to Norway from Budapest, where he had gone to make arrangements for an anthology of Hungarian writers on Scandinavian literature. The author prefaces his report with the statement that "while Western diplomats in East-dominated states are reduced to meeting official personages who there—as at home—are rarely characterized by a true 'esprit,' it was my lot to talk not only with high authorities but also with a number of the foremost men within Hungarian intellectual circles, and among them many who are not regarded with especial good will by the official administration."—The Editors

It is certainly unnecessary to emphasize to you the fact that the prevailing ideas of the Western world concerning Hungary are exceedingly grotesque and largely incompatible with reality. To take "the political situation" (as the West calls it) first, our domestic concepts are inadequate to evaluate conditions in such a heterogeneous country as Hungary where the line separating what we call the "regime" from what we call the "opposition" lies on an entirely different plane than in our own model state.

The truth is that after Poland, Hungary is relatively the most free, or the least unfree country in the Eastern world. I know too that you do not belong with the "formula-thinkers" who fancy that freedom is something one does or does not possess. On the contrary, there are as many degrees between what we call suppression and what we call liberty as between poverty and riches. I shall here try to place present-day Hungary in its proper position on this scale.

To begin with, a few remarks about the Russian occupation: I trust that you have long been aware that the Russian occupation of Hungary is now little more than a formality. It is also known that confidential negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops

are under way. Khrushchev, as far as I can understand, would like to utilize such an evacuation as a bargaining point; and he demands a good price, while Kennedy, for his part, is willing to offer only moderate compensation, namely, the removal of the "Hungary question" from the agenda of the United Nations. I am inclined to think that here Khrushchev will have to be satisfied with a lean agreement, since Kennedy knows very well that the Russian occupation of Hungary no longer has any real significance and that an evacuation would not alter the international balance of power, but would be only a symbolic gesture which, indeed, would be to the advantage of the Eastern bloc. The present regime in Hungary would not be weakened by such an evacuation; on the contrary, it would achieve far greater respect in Hungary itself, at the same time that Khrushchev would be relieved of what has perhaps been his heaviest burden in efforts for relief of tension between East and West.

The primary and most important step in the relaxation of authority has been the release of the great majority of those sentenced to prison terms following the revolution of 1956. Most of these have already been free for several years. I have no figures as to how many are still imprisoned, nor into what categories these prisoners may fall. Nevertheless, I believe that I have reliable information as to the intellectuals still in bondage. The British Pen Club published in its bulletin for the summer of 1961 a list of thirteen intellectuals thought at that time to be in prison. The list was out of date even at the time of issue. One of the men listed, the internationally reputed historian, Professor Kosary, had been released a year and a half before this list appeared. At the time of my recent visit to Budapest, eight of these thirteen were at liberty. You are undoubtedly aware that there are still three professors in prison: Istvan Bibó, György Adam, and Ferenc Herceli. It is, however, assumed in Hungary that an extended amnesty will be granted within the next six months. A release of these three learned men would have far greater significance than many of the liberations to date, since it would mark the close of a long and tragic phase in Hungary's history.

You will be pleased to hear that the treatment of political prisoners following the "October revolt" differed perceptibly

from the procedures utilized by Rakosi and his cohorts in the terror-years of 1949-1953. As you know, Kadar himself was among the many who were jailed and mistreated in the course of these years. Those who since 1956 have been condemned to what we in the outer world call "Kadar's prisons" have, on the other hand, been dealt with very decently. Writers and scientists have, in fact, been able to continue work on their own projects. In order to overcome possible suspicion, I should perhaps mention here a concrete example. The man who in the years prior to 1956 stood in the first ranks of Hungarian authors in the campaign which led to the great demonstrations on October 23, 1956, was Tibor Dery. In 1957 he was condemned to nine years' imprisonment. While in prison he wrote a satirical novel, and was permitted to retain all of his papers upon his release after two and a half years. To be sure, this novel is not yet printed, and Tibor Dery will not release it abroad before it can be published in his own country.

For a native of a country like Norway, where we enjoy nearly complete freedom of the press, and where it is even possible for persons in opposition to the government to publish their opinions in the government's own primary organ, it is naturally discouraging to observe the strict practices of the Hungarian authorities in determining what shall or shall not appear in print. Certainly our own freedom of the press does not mean that newspapers and publishing houses are obligated to print everything written, but at least we can publish whatever we like at our own expense; and even though it is seldom exercised, this freedom is, in my opinion, the most priceless treasure of our land. It is a freedom which is denied the Hungarian writers. Those who are *persona non grata* have not yet been able to publish their works. Let me at once add that these authors are not deprived of their means of subsistence, since they are fully occupied with translation work, but this is scarcely the ideal employment for writers of top calibre. There are others who are acceptable for publication, but this does not apply to everything they might wish to present. Still others in the camp of the opposition are able to get their books printed, but in such limited editions that the stocks are exhausted within a few days.

All this we must unconditionally designate as extremely severe sanctions, in consideration of our high regard for free thought and free speech as against any kind of demand for conformity. However, I should present an incomplete picture of present-day Hungarian intellectual life if I were content to point out only these negative characteristics. In the first place, the past year has seen a considerable easing of the terms for the writers of the October revolt, a fact which I easily ascertained in the process of editing the anthology on Scandinavian literature. Two of the foremost contributors to this anthology, Tibor Dery and Professor György Lukacs, whom I met for the first time last summer, have now achieved a far stronger position than they held only a year ago. The absolute ban on Dery has been raised to the extent that he now has obtained a contract for the publication of a short story collection. And Professor Lukacs, who has been shelved for over five years, is now going to publish his great new *Aesthetics*, not only in West Germany but also in Budapest. A Norwegian coming to Hungary's capital will, at the same time, be struck by another phenomenon, not as flattering to our national self-esteem as our pride over our intellectual freedom, namely, that that which we refer to by a somewhat shop-worn phrase as "the intellectual life" is there richer and more intense than in our extraordinarily free Oslo. This comparison may not prove much, but we can substitute Vienna for Oslo—or Munich, Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin—indeed I should venture to say any of the Western world's larger cities with the exception of Paris and London—and Budapest will still maintain its supremacy. This is no new revelation. In their exile, not a few Hungarian emigrants have come to the same conclusion. And they know this in Budapest, the authorities as well as the writers. One of the fortunate results of the October revolt is that we in the Western world are at last beginning to make the same discovery.

It is impossible for me to describe this atmosphere, since any generalization would have to make use of clichés and would present a false picture. In addition, my personal experiences are of necessity limited in scope. Instead I shall indicate a way by which even an outsider can assure himself at least a small glimpse. A periodical entitled *New Hungarian Quarterly* (Corvina Press)

is now being issued in Budapest. It is printed in English and contains approximately a thousand pages annually of Hungarian essays, short stories, and literary criticism. Like all such publications in the Eastern states, it is partially official; and authors who were in the foreground in October, 1956, such as Tibor Dery and Gyula Hay, have not yet been accepted as contributors, though many of their friends and kindred spirits are included. Here one may also find recent works by Gyula Illyes, Laszlo Nemeth, and Peter Veres, three of the most distinguished authors of our time. At the moment this is possibly the most interesting literary periodical in Europe, because it is remarkable testimony to the fact that in a country whose entire history consists of domination by foreign powers, suppression under domestic tyrants, and freedom-struggles doomed to defeat, there has arisen in the midst of every kind of submissiveness and vileness a bulwark of self-willed men with deep roots both in their own country's ancient traditions of liberty and in the whole body of European culture.

The present easing of tension is also apparent in the constantly growing contact between Hungary and the Western world. Those who are only interested in Hungary as a slogan, without regard for the country itself or for its people, are scarcely up to date on current happenings there. The Hungarian refugees are better informed, since the severe restrictions on outgoing travel have been eased, and many of them have enjoyed visits from their parents during the past summer. In addition, the borders are now about to be opened to those condemned to prison following the October revolt. During my stay in Budapest this summer, I had the pleasure of extending an invitation to Tibor Dery to visit Oslo this autumn as the guest of the Norwegian Authors Association. The Hungarian authorities and Tibor Dery himself have only one reservation in connection with such a trip. His name has become a symbol, and his journey abroad will provide weighty evidence of the new climate in Hungary. But how is he to deal with the many sensation-seeking journalists who will require of him a public criticism of his country's government, thus exploiting the relaxation of tension to transform it into a new stab in the Cold War? Would that I knew of an elixir to persuade journalists who know little about Hungary and

less of Hungarian literature to let this man not be disturbed too much during such a visit!*

For anyone wishing to formulate an accurate picture of conditions in a country, it is imperative, in the first place, to meet members of the government, and to talk with them not only in their offices, but also at social events where more free expression is possible. I must perhaps deplore that the Hungarian government's hierarchy was not my particular field of observation during this visit. Had it been so, I would have received a much-desired glimpse into the primary concerns of the top leadership, the divergent opinions in current politics, and eventual internal power struggles. It is a well known fact, however, that our willingness to express ourselves is often in inverse proportion to our insight. I personally also enjoy the advantageous position of being able to express myself quite freely on the rule and management of other states without consequences to myself and without any appreciable effect on the course of the world. I shall therefore oblige with the immodesty expected of me in connection with an evaluation of the present Hungarian regime, although, in preference to my own words, I shall make use of what I have learned from a Hungarian who is accorded the highest respect both in his own country and in the world at large. It is not customary even in confidential diplomatic reports to cite names, but I shall nevertheless do so here, since I am certain that this man would have nothing against the publication of his viewpoint. He is Peter Veres, peasant leader and writer, chairman of the Hungarian Authors Association in the autumn of 1956, and the main speaker at the Bem statue in the student demonstration on October 23, 1956, which instituted the great revolt.

I met him for the first time last summer in the Authors Association meeting house, this time in his home in a rural suburb of Buda. I took the liberty of asking him his opinion of the present head of the Hungarian government, Janos Kadar.

"I shall answer you," he said, "with an allegory. You know that de Gaulle is a very wise man. I need say no more."

Nor was it necessary for me to inquire further, for we all

* The author has asked us to add that Tibor Dery now has his passport. He left Budapest on March 12th, 1963, for Vienna. He and his wife will later visit Paris, London, and Oslo.—The Editors

know that de Gaulle has contrived to free himself from those who were his staunchest supporters when he first took over authority in his country.

Kadar's role in the preface to the October days, his participation in the revolt against the old regime, and his cooperation with the Soviet authorities during the Russian intervention are topics which I shall not treat here, but take up at a later date in connection with an historical analysis of the entire course of events during the autumn of 1956. What is now on the agenda in Hungary seems to be how to be quit of the evil heritage following this drama. This is a question difficult for a stranger to answer, since it includes so many complicated circumstances, both with regard to changes of viewpoint and of personal relations between warriors once pledged to a common cause who have now come to stand, in a literal sense, on opposite sides of the barricade. There is also a great deal still veiled in mystery for, in contrast to the maxim for science and literature, it is not a part of politics to reveal the naked truth to the world in general. There are, however, a few circumstances which I believe I may outline.

In the first place, the ideas that sustained the October revolt did not suffer an unconditional defeat. The revolt was a raging flood over the land, and much was permanently swept away under its might. The destruction of the great Stalin statue in Budapest was not only a symbolic act but also a pattern for what was later to take place in the official government of the Soviet Union itself. It is therefore not unreasonable that those who led the action in Budapest demand not only rehabilitation but honor.

The great demonstration in Budapest on October 23, 1956, was itself a fruit of the liberalization in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The immediate prototype was the peaceful revolution in Poland on that dramatic Friday, the 19th of October. The power of the Hungarian rebellion, nevertheless, nearly led to a restoration of the Russian Stalinists' authority in Moscow, and it was only last autumn that the Stalinist supremacy in Russia was permanently liquidated.

In Hungary, the foremost Hungarian Stalinists were deprived of all power during the October revolt, and they have

not been able to regain their political position. But in the process of a shift of regime it is undeniably easier to get rid of a small group of leaders than to be quit of the larger part of a bureaucracy. Many of the former Hungarian Stalinists still hold important positions in the official administration; and even though some of them have revised their opinions, they are, on the whole, a burden for the liberalization taking place. One finds, therefore, among ordinary Hungarian citizens, far greater respect and appreciation for the head of the government, Janos Kadar, than for his officials.

Hungary's darkest days after November, 1956, were in June, 1958, when the Ministry of Justice announced the sentence and execution of the October government's chief executive, Imre Nagy, together with four of his closest collaborators. This was a sentence presumably carried out in accordance with Russian orders and primarily, perhaps, as a warning to Tito and a gesture of courtesy to Mao. It was, in any case, an infamous judgment which will be recorded in Hungary's history with no less shame than Austria's execution of Lajos Batthyany, head of the Hungarian revolutionary government in 1848. I fancy that Kadar, acting on the maxim that in power politics one is often forced to choose the lesser of two evils, took responsibility for these death sentences in order to save the lives of four others accused in the same trial. These four others were sentenced instead to long prison terms, but all have now been released. It also seems likely that these death sentences were a sacrifice that Khrushchev, for his part, had to pay to the Stalinist wing, at that time still powerful within the Russian party leadership. If these assumptions are correct, it is not at all improbable that under Hungary's present regime there will sooner or later be a rehabilitation of Imre Nagy. This will obviously not restore life to the dead. Yet it will be an act of decisive historical significance, for such a rehabilitation is an important prerequisite to the termination of Hungary's bitterest heritage after the fateful drama of 1956.

This is still the music of the future. What happens in Hungary is also to a certain extent dependent upon developments in the international arena. Yet the Hungarian tragedy of 1956 has perhaps been the greatest strain upon relations between

East and West during the past decade, and a relaxation of the situation in Hungary should thus in itself contribute to the relief of international tension. In this delicate play, we in the Western world have a not unimportant role, since one of the conditions for a clearing of the air between East and West is our willingness, instead of using the name "Hungary" only as a slogan, to demonstrate at least a modicum of interest in what is actually taking place in that country.

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A LETTER TO W. H. FERRY

BY PAUL A. BARAN

Both the West Coast magazine *Frontier*, and the magazine *Liberation*, in their January, 1963, issues published a piece entitled "What Price for Peace?" by our good friend W. H. Ferry of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Before the text was published, Mr. Ferry sent copies to a number of people, including ourselves and Professor Paul Baran of the Stanford University Economics Department. A multilateral correspondence developed, in the course of which Professor Baran wrote the following letter to Mr. Ferry, sending a copy to us. It seemed to us to raise issues which no worker for peace can afford to neglect. We therefore requested and received Professor Baran's permission to publish the letter in MR.—The Editors

Dear Ping:

It was kind of you to send me the text of your interesting talk "What Price for Peace?" I have decided to take time out to write to you about it at some length because (1) I profoundly respect your attitude and your effort, and (2) your speech brings to the fore an issue which I consider to be of over-riding importance to all activities on behalf of peace.

The issue is: What price for saying publicly what needs to be said? This price has apparently become—even among the very best and eloquent spokesmen for reason, of whom you are one—a strict adherence to two injunctions: (1) the question of war or peace, of catastrophe or survival, of arms race or disarmament, is to be treated as a strictly ideational matter, as a problem in "our" political imagination, in "our" understanding, or in "our" "idiocy"; and (2) whatever is then said about American policies must be introduced and accompanied by the refrain, "A plague on both your houses." I submit that if this price has to be paid for the right to raise one's voice against the lethal madness of the course followed by our ruling class (and under its influence, by our nation), *everything one says becomes automatically nullified*, indeed tends to discredit the cause of reason. The means commence to devour the end; instead

of contributing to the desperately needed clarification of the issues, one unwittingly substitutes one obfuscation for another. For Arnold Toynbee's words, "We have either to resign ourselves to committing mass suicide or else to learn to live together as a single family," which you approvingly quote, are precisely those "sounds as meaningless as the chaffering of finches" of which you (and I) are so terribly tired.

More concretely: "The price of peace is too high for Americans," you say, "because the price tag includes giving up many—I am tempted to say most—of our cherished ideas. The price of peace is too high for Russians for the same reason." And you continue in the following paragraph: "The plain fact is that both sides are embarked on a course of high idiocy, and neither has any idea how to stop or change it." I consider these statements to be so inaccurate as to be highly misleading. The problem faced by the ruling class of the United States is not giving up any cherished *ideas*, nor is it even its own exceptional idiocy. The problem, in my humble view, is twofold: "This country," as you correctly observe, "has already institutionalized the arms race. We have what looks like a permanent war economy." (Incidentally, by estimating the amount devoted to the military at 9 percent of the GNP one understates the economic significance of the arms race. Taking into account all the ramifications of war expenditures, one arrives at something like 25 percent of the GNP depending directly or indirectly on military outlays.) And since, as you also correctly observe, a discontinuation of the arms race would bring about nothing short of "economic chaos" in this country, a chaos by comparison with which the Great Depression would look like a minor "frictional" disturbance, it can readily be seen that disarmament is not the kind of a thing that the ruling class can plunge into with great alacrity. Indeed, from its standpoint, it would be "high idiocy" to do so. What is more, the institutionalized war economy provides not only for a measure of economic stability, it has also institutionalized an entire network of vested interests. Giving up the arms race would be, as far as those vested interests are concerned, not a betrayal of *ideas*, but the much more serious betrayal of *profits*. Secondly, as you perfectly well realize, Communism as a world-wide movement against the institution of

private property in the means of production and comprehensive economic planning is—in spite of all its difficulties, internal frictions, grave faults, and errors—spreading over the globe with, historically speaking, unprecedented rapidity. In terms of decades or even years, it represents a “clear and present danger” to the capitalist order in Latin America, in the Near East, in Asia, and in Africa. That the American ruling class cannot watch this process with equanimity stands to reason. What is involved are not only the by no means irrelevant American investments abroad, but even more important, the entire problem of the “living space” of monopoly capital. Those who talk about Citadel America, about forgetting the rest of the world and concentrating on this country, if there are still such, are fossils from a distant past. The capitalist system in this country needs an “environment,” needs a “free world” to move about in. *The maintenance of as much capitalism as possible in the world at large is a vital necessity for the ruling class of the United States.* Far from being “high idiocy,” this is a reasonably well understood class interest. And the upkeep of a powerful military establishment, the capacity to conduct local police actions, and more extended operations, the ability to serve as the world’s policeman guarding private property everywhere, are indispensable means for adequately serving this class interest. With the class struggle having moved into the international arena, McNamara and his brain-trusters are modern men, adjusting their thinking and activities to the requirements of the new era.

Nor has the plague-on-both-your-houses proposition any other leg to stand on. Everything we know about the Soviet economy and society teaches us beyond doubt that disarmament and far-reaching curtailment of military outlays would not produce anything like “economic chaos,” would not lead to economic catastrophe, but would instead work in precisely the opposite direction. It would enable the Soviet economy to devote more resources to sorely under-capitalized agriculture, to do more in the areas of housing, consumer goods production, and so forth. Should it be thought that this is too materialistic an approach to the matter, that the Soviet leadership is not guided by such mundane matters but is more interested in guns than

in butter, in power than in welfare, it would be important to realize that the very power of the Soviet leaders, their capacity to survive politically and to enjoy popularity at home is inextricably bound up with their ability to provide their people with better and rising living standards. Such difficulties as they do have at home do not stem from an insufficient expansiveness abroad, but rather from insufficiently rapid overcoming of poverty at home. If they do not undertake unilateral disarmament, it is not because they cannot divorce themselves from the *idea* of the arms race, it is strictly because they are desperately afraid of a Western attack. Fleming's two volumes on the history of Soviet-Western relations are nothing if not a convincing proof that it is this fear that has dominated Soviet policies ever since the earliest Western interventions.* Is it "high idiocy" on their part to fear—in the light of the historical record of the last 45 years—that lacking an effective deterrent power, they would be faced by another Hitlerite onslaught at worst, or by a concerted effort at strangulation à la Cuba at best?

Thus, to my mind, the treatment of the matter as an ideational problem as well as one involving symmetrical responsibility of both sides in the Cold War places all the accents where they do not belong. The conflict is due to the fact that capitalism, of which the United States is now the most powerful and most aggressive spearhead, is desperately struggling for the continuation of its dominance. The maintenance of an overwhelming military establishment in the West is diabolically rational: it not merely prevents an economic catastrophe in the United States; it systematically and inexorably keeps the socialist camp off balance, slows down its progress, and reduces its ability to provide its peoples with a better life. It thus "contains" socialism not so much militarily (this is *not* an issue!) but by rendering it less capable of becoming a beacon of hope and light to the starving masses all over the world. Surely Cuba did not have to be deterred from military aggression; the embargo, the blockade, the continual threat of invasion, and so forth, by creating severe economic strains on the island *may have* (I

* D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, 2 Vols., New York, 1961.—Ed.

don't know whether it is so or not) reduced the magnetism of Fidelismo in Latin America.

What conclusions are to be drawn from all this? As far as we "peaceniks" are concerned, primarily the necessity to show clearly that the struggle for peace can only be meaningfully conducted as a struggle against capitalism. It must be unequivocally stated that it is impossible to inveigh against military spending unless one simultaneously demands planning for the transition to and the stability of a peaceful economy. We shall never get the support of people for the repetition of the Great Depression, however eloquently we tell them that the present road leads to annihilation. The demilitarization of our economy can only be obtained by a massive action for its socialization. Short of that, the talk remains on the level of preaching, with the negative result that both the preachers and their congregations after an hour of moral uplift return to their previous state of passivity and impotence. You may say that talking about socialism in the United States today is even more utopian than talking about peace and demilitarization. My only answer is your own, for "utopianism is precisely what is needed in the thickening mists of contemporary politics." And I may add, also in your own words, that "my attitude is also partly a matter of temperament, which I shall explain only by saying that I wish my epitaph to read: 'He tried'."

Neither position is perhaps very conducive to cheer and optimism, and doom may overtake both of them without discrimination. Nevertheless in the lonely battle in which one is engaged it is a minimal source of satisfaction to have reason on one's side; and it is indispensable to do one's utmost to be as clear, as precise, and as outspoken as the gravity of the issue demands. This, I consider, to be the only possible and permissible strategy and the only possible and permissible tactic.

I hope you don't mind what may sound like, but is not intended to be, a shrill tirade.

Cordially yours,
Paul A. Baran

WHAT KIND OF REVOLUTION FOR LATIN AMERICA?

BY B. A. LESHEM

I want to say *muchas gracias* for your Notes on Latin America in the March issue. The exhilaration of your trip leaped from your words in a way that made this reader nostalgic. But more important, the Notes are filled with fresh, perceptive insights and you caught so well the grand design of Latin America in ferment and pregnant with revolution.

There are, however, points on which I would take issue, particularly your estimate of the nature of the future Latin American revolutions. You are entirely right that property relations and the ruling classes in the countries outside of Cuba are basically bourgeois. But it seems to me you oversimplify. In some countries the feudal heritage has greater weight than you imply. And while it is true that "any analysis and, still more, any course of action that is based on the assumption of division and conflict of interest between landlords and capitalists is bound to go wrong," I would italicize "based" and add: it is no less true that any analysis and course of action that fails to take into consideration conflicts between different sections of the ruling classes and between some native capitalists and United States Big Business is also bound to go wrong. Your Notes err in the latter respect. This leads you to discuss future possibilities in Latin America in terms of a simplistic formula: either bourgeois or socialist revolution; and since you exclude the first as everywhere a *fait accompli*, mostly by evolutionary processes, the only alternative is socialist revolution.

History does not as a rule pose alternatives in such absolutist terms. First, in every Latin American country, capitalist development has been stunted and deformed in varying degree by the feudal heritage and by foreign domination. In most countries this is also reflected in the limited development of bourgeois democracy and the relative ease with which democratic liberties can be abrogated. Secondly, all these countries

are only semi-independent, being in fact provinces of the U.S. economic and political empire. It is the unfinished business of the bourgeois revolution and of the struggle for national independence that most directly confronts the underdeveloped, hungry, unfree nations of Latin America.

In a country like Paraguay it would therefore be theoretically possible for a revolution to take place that would overthrow the dictatorship, introduce democratic liberties, launch genuine agrarian reform, and adopt measures to curb and eventually expropriate U.S. big capital without immediately transcending the limits of bourgeois relations. It seems to me that, allowing for national differences, something similar is *theoretically* possible in every Latin American country, while your Notes maintain that both theoretically and practically "the only possible revolution is one that overthrows bourgeois rule."

You buttress this theory by discussing the "reform potential" of the Latin American ruling classes, concluding it is low and incapable of solving the urgent economic problems within the existing system. What you fail to discuss is the reform potential of the Latin American *masses* and such bourgeois and middle-class allies as will march with them even part way. It is of course utopian to expect that in Mexico or Brazil the not inconsiderable capitalist groups that have substantial conflicts with their U.S. competitors would lead a revolution for radical domestic reform and true national independence. But it is not utopian to expect them to lend some support to a revolution (violent or peaceful) whose basic strength is the action of workers, peasants, students, and revolutionary intellectuals. I am here not presenting a formula, but merely outlining what I think is possible and probable with all sorts of conceivable and inconceivable variations in most Latin American countries.

I have no doubt that such a revolution will not be able to survive for long without fashioning a new people's army and a new democratic governing machine as well as adopting state capitalist measures that restrict private ownership. All these would be transition steps, more or less rapid, toward the socialist revolution and would tend to alienate most bourgeois support.

Let us descend from the Olympus of theory to mundane

reality. What about the revolutions that have actually taken place in Latin America since the second world war? In Guatemala in 1944, bourgeois, middle-class, and army elements overthrew the hated U.S.-backed Ubico tyranny. Reforms were adopted, schools were built, trade union and peasant movements came into being under progressive leadership. Later under the more left (though non-socialist) Arbenz government an ambitious agrarian reform was launched. In the two years that it lasted it produced remarkable results. The fact that the Guatemalan government was overthrown in 1954 by the CIA with the help of Guatemalan traitors is another matter: it does not refute the theoretical and practical possibility of democratic non-socialist revolution in Latin America. The same is true of the betrayal of the Bolivian and Venezuelan revolutions, although the two situations are not identical.

What you write about Venezuela does not bear out your thesis. There the Left is engaged in a large-scale struggle (including guerrilla actions) against the Betancourt government. For what purpose? "To force the government to change its policies, to drop its repressive methods, to move vigorously to secure a larger share of oil revenues for Venezuela, and to use these revenues in a planned way for the benefit of the masses." All this without socialist revolution. What this means is that the Venezuelan Left is seeking to save and drive forward the democratic non-socialist revolution which overthrew the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958, while recognizing that, fully to achieve these aims, more fundamental change will eventually be necessary.

In British Guiana a left government with a socialist outlook came to power through an election. No socialist revolution took place there, nor will it the day after British Guiana wins independence. The Jagan government is in fact striving to develop capitalism in British Guiana (of course not the old-style, colonialist, uninhibited capitalism).

Cuba is a more complicated question and requires more extensive discussion than there is space for here. Morray agrees with many Cuban leaders that a non-socialist phase preceded the socialist revolution that Fidel Castro proclaimed at the time of the April 1961 invasion.

REPLY BY THE EDITORS

It seems to me that posing socialist revolution as the next (although not imminent) step for Latin America is out of tune with recent Latin American experience and with the objectives of Latin American progressives. As in Mexico, these progressives are setting their sights toward a broad spectrum of democratic, anti-imperialist change without placing socialist revolution on the agenda for the immediate future.

REPLY

BY THE EDITORS

Mr. Leshem is quite right that Latin American economies are deformed by a combination of feudal (or semi-feudal) heritages and foreign domination. Under these circumstances, the logical way for a revolution to begin is as an assault on these deformities via agrarian reform, nationalization of foreign monopolies, diversification of trading relationships, etc. Our argument is simply that such an assault will not be led by the Latin American bourgeoisies both because they (and not a parasitic aristocracy) own the land and because they have interests in common with the foreign overlord and fear the withdrawal of his protection. The assaults must be carried out by broadly based popular movements, and these movements must be fully prepared from the outset to meet bitter resistance from their own bourgeoisies and from the imperialist countries, chiefly the United States. In the process of breaking this resistance, they will unavoidably transcend the limits of capitalism and lay the foundations of socialist societies. Essentially, this is what has happened in Cuba, and we believe that it is what is bound to happen, when conditions are ripe, in the rest of Latin America. What Guatemala shows is simply that the revolution will be abortive if the resistance of the domestic oligarchy and the foreign imperialists is not broken.

This does not mean of course that no members of the bour-

geoisie will support or take part in future Latin American revolutions. Many will, often in positions of leadership, and the more the better. What it does mean is that *as a class* the bourgeoisie will be counter-revolutionary and that only the peasantry and proletariat can be considered to have a genuine revolutionary potential. It also means that in Latin American conditions the unfinished tasks of the bourgeois revolution can be carried out only in the context of a *socialist* revolution. To believe anything else is to sow the seed not only of theoretical illusion but also of political error and possibly even disaster.



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AMERICAN RADICALISM: REJOINDER

BY RONALD RADOSH

With this reply by Ronald Radosh the discussion of American Radicalism is now closed.—The Editors

The arguments advanced in reply to my essay on American radicalism by Robert Forrey and Max Gordon provide further evidence of the extent to which the American socialist movement has ceased to be radical and has dissolved into liberalism. Both Forrey and Gordon criticize me for advocating an all-or-nothing program—revolution or reform. Therefore they both consider me a De Leonite in modern dress and answer by stressing the importance of supporting reform measures and participating in day-to-day struggles.

Had this been my position, my article would truly have presented an old argument. But if Forrey and Gordon had read the article closely they would have understood that I was not interested in castigating radicals who support reform; my purpose was rather to develop a critique of radicals who call themselves socialists, Communists, or Marxists, but in reality hold a liberal view of the society in which they live.

By pointing out that Henry A. Wallace was an individual interested in basing a harmony of opposed economic interests on continuing American expansion abroad, I hoped to illustrate the fallacy of supporting men like Wallace simply because they are reformers; and of abandoning the task of creating an independent American socialist movement. When Wallace supported reform measures such as the Full Employment Bill of 1945, he noted that if businessmen were left to do things their own way, the U.S. "would be thrown into such a tailspin that the system would be overthrown." Wallace believed the capitalist system had to be saved. He wrote that "it should not, as many radical reformers have suggested, be uprooted. It should be modernized and made to work." His means of making it work was the capture of large export markets for American industry. Wallace was frank to point out his indebtedness to Herbert Hoover. "I have

considerable sympathy with Herbert Hoover's problem as Secretary of Commerce right now," he stated upon becoming Secretary of Commerce, "because I can say that I am going to go all out to get the maximum use of whatever powers may reside in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to foster and develop trade here and abroad." Predicting an excess of exports over imports for ten years after the war, Wallace admitted he "would be contributing perhaps as much as any single individual to producing a situation like that for which I criticized the Republican Party back in the decade of the twenties."

My contention is that it should have been the responsibility of radicals during this period to reveal the ideological basis of the corporate liberal's approach to society, not to give their backing to those liberals who supported trade with Russia or various reform measures. It was their responsibility to present a radical alternative, to challenge men whose sole means of promoting domestic prosperity was expansion abroad and the creation of an American economic empire.

The issue which divides a radical from a liberal is not support of reform—but whether support for expansion-minded reformers is the way to transform our society. The path advocated by Gordon and Forrey has been traveled since the 1930's, and the result has been the strengthening of capitalism and the dissipation of the socialist movement. The Left has been content to act as a grouping of militant trade unionists who occasionally use left phraseology but who concentrate their attention on the day-to-day struggles.

The policies of the old Socialist Party differed sharply from the tactics and analysis offered by more contemporary "socialists." The prewar SP did not support a De Leonite dual-union policy or raise the issue in terms of reform vs. revolution. The Socialists functioned within the AF of L, and participated in many militant strikes and struggles. But their method of working in the union movement was radically different from that of the Communists during the New Deal. Under the leadership of men like Max Hayes and James H. Maurer, the Socialists won positions of leadership as known and proclaimed Socialists, and attended union conventions with the expressed purpose of advocating nationalization and challenging the Gompers leader-

ship on domestic and foreign policies. The Communists, on the other hand, denied their own affiliations and won influence through individual effort or machine manipulation. When the Cold War began, they found themselves with no substantial rank-and-file support, and the Reuthers were able to take over and bring the unions into the Cold War consensus.

Max Gordon argues that it was precisely the SP's program of socialism in the 1930's which led to electoral decline, and that this shows the fallacy of engaging in socialist political action. As Bert Cochran has pointed out, it was only the Communists' Russian attachment which allowed them to absorb themselves in the New Deal and still maintain their identity as a special current.* The SP dissolved itself in the larger movement because it lacked this affiliation—and eventually most of the Socialists left the SP to become part of the New Deal. To evaluate the merits of socialist action, one must turn not to the 1930's but to the 1900's, when the SP competed not only with Democrats and Republicans but with various reform and fusion movements. In the SP's period of greatest growth, a policy deemed "sectarian" today gained more support and created more socialist consciousness than supposedly more realistic policies did at a later period. As Cochran summed it up, if the pre-First World War Socialist Party had been transplanted to the 1930's, "it would have grown far more strongly than did the Communists with their ultra-Rooseveltianism, and would have made a more profound and lasting impact on the era."

The Communists' liberalism is not revealed by their support of worthwhile reform measures, as Forrey has me arguing, but by their advocacy of speed-up, opposition to John L. Lewis' war-time coal strikes, opposition to Randolph's Negro March on Washington, and the call for extending the no-strike pledge to the postwar era. These policies were not simply opportunist errors: they were the logical culmination of long-standing acceptance of the policies of the corporate leadership of the New Deal. If the Left had really been successful in creating social consciousness by following these policies, then the Cold War

* Bert Cochran, "Two Radical Decades in American History," *The American Socialist*, June, 1958.

would not have got off the ground so easily and with such little opposition.

Both Gordon and Forrey separate foreign from domestic policy, evidently believing that there is no connection between the two. Because Gordon believes that politically aware Americans had "a genuine concern" for bringing democracy to the rest of the world, he attributes American entrance into the Second World War to the people's anti-fascist sentiment. In keeping with this view he does not (and the Communists did not at the time) develop a radical analysis of the causes of American entry or of the manner in which it was obtained. It was left to the "conservative" Charles Beard to raise the question of the character of a leadership which shows so little confidence in its citizens that it lies about the issue of war or peace, and the quality of a democracy which leaves the citizen no choice but acquiescence in the prior decisions of the executive. To raise this question does not mean opposition to waging an anti-fascist war. It means simply that the question is important in its own right and ought to be squarely faced.

The essence of the New Deal was to define domestic welfare as dependence upon acceptance of America's policies by the rest of the world. As Kennedy does today, FDR consciously made domestic problems into issues of foreign policy. Men like Max Gordon claim to oppose the fruits of the idea that it is America's mission to reform the world, although they and the Communists were quick to externalize evil (and good) when FDR was in the White House. In terms of democratic morality, one might ask in what way Kennedy's "managed-news" policy is any more objectionable than Roosevelt's method of bringing the country into the war.

The major issue today is not whether the Left should support a Bowles or attack a Goldwater. It is true that the two men do not have the same position, but it is also true that there is no principled difference between a desire to starve the Cuban people into submission and a desire to crush them by armed intervention. To prevent the guns from going off, it is only common sense to attack the logic of those who argue the necessity for a starvation policy.

The main problem for the Left to raise is who started the

Cold War anyway, and who permitted the question to arise as to whether the United States should go to war over Cuba. It was the liberals, from Wilson in 1917 to Kennedy in 1963, who waged the Cold War and refused to live in peace with peoples setting out on the socialist path. In the specific case of Cuba it was FDR's administration which intervened aggressively in Cuba to stave off social revolution, bring Cuba under conservative leadership, protect American economic investment in Cuba, and create new markets for American products. Although Gordon and Forrey may see no connection between the New Deal's institution of Batista's rule in 1934 and the current crisis, it is certain that the Cuban people do. To be sure, FDR intervened successfully without sending in the marines, but his intervention was none the less real. If the liberals had permitted the Cuban people to control their own destiny in the 1930's, there would in all probability be no Cuban crisis today.

Finally, Gordon and Forrey, because they shy away from raising the issue of the necessity of a socialist solution, confuse the problem of alliance with liberals on the one hand and subordination to the policies and ideology of corporate liberalism on the other. Socialists (excluding those who are adherents of some of the small sects) naturally desire to be part of broad progressive movements, but they ought to insist upon retaining their independence of action in order to influence people to accept the necessity of a socialist solution. An individual may prosper within various movements by refraining from acting as a socialist, but if all socialists followed this course there would be no socialist movement. On the other hand, a strong socialist movement functioning, say, as part of a broad peace movement, could strengthen the peace movement by shedding light on the nature of American foreign policy and thus weakening the hand of those peace leaders who support State Department policy and court the approval of the Dodds and Walters. But since Gordon sees socialism occurring without the creation of a conscious socialist movement, the nature of the relation between socialists and progressives is of no concern to him.

Essentially, both Gordon and Forrey believe that socialism will come through the struggle for reform. This is, however, essentially a liberal, not a socialist, approach. It was the con-

tribution of Karl Marx to explain, as Herbert Marcuse has pointed out in his study *Reason and Revolution*, that in order to create a socialist revolution a certain level of material and intellectual culture, a self-conscious working class, and class struggle are necessary. But these conditions lead to revolution only if directed by conscious activity aimed at the socialist goal. No natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition to socialism. It was the revisionists who adopted a positivist view of society and abandoned Marx's dialectical view for the thesis that the existing state of affairs would evolve towards a rational society. While Marx argued that natural laws gave expression to the blind process of capitalist production and that socialist revolution would bring emancipation from these laws, the revisionists claimed that the natural laws guaranteed the inevitable development towards socialism. In this manner, the necessity for conscious human practice was abandoned and in its place was put the "authority" of natural law. Gordon and Forrey are in this revisionist tradition, and it would be welcome if they would acknowledge it and give up their claim to be Marxists.

Some tactics may be necessary because of the weak state of the socialist movement, but to make a virtue out of political necessity is to substitute opportunism for a principled radical position. The issue is not whether to cooperate with liberals for immediate ends, but how to present the need for a socialist solution and reach people with this message. The issue is not reform or revolution, socialism or participation in broad struggles—but how to combine flexible tactics with the creation of an independent and mass political party of socialism. The need is to think and act as radicals, and to offer the American people an alternative to the ideology and policies advocated by the corporate Cold War liberals. Will the American Left accept the Marxian challenge to change our world, dispense with a liberal positivist outlook, and begin the hard but necessary task of establishing a socialist movement in the United States?

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Brazil Is Pioneering

"Brazil is still in the pioneering stage," said a Rio de Janeiro economist. "Chattel slavery has disappeared but serfdom under the plantation system still exists in the most backward areas. In the big cities and in the rapidly growing centers of mining, manufacture, commerce, and finance, private business and professional people are shaping the new economic, social, and political forces. A middle class and a middle-class mentality are growing like mad. Trade schools and apprenticeships are turning country boys and girls into qualified machine operators. Workers who formerly worked part-time in cane and cotton fields are getting steady jobs in factories and on construction work. For the first time in their lives millions of these people have regular pay checks, decent houses or apartments, shoes, a change of clothing, a chance to send their children to school, and the beginnings—only the beginnings—of social security. Millions of people belong to trade unions, benefit societies, social clubs. In a word, they are being civilized. They are also being collectivized and prepared to live as self-respecting citizens of a socialist society.

"This is the broad picture. As to details, our first problem is to see that no one goes hungry, that everyone learns to read and write, that scourges like malaria, tuberculosis, hookworm, and dysentery are wiped out, and that the young people of this new generation have neighborhoods, parks, workplaces, and play spaces of which they can be justly proud.

"We begin with a simple proposition: something for everybody. That means a minimum wage, a limited work day and work week, and the political means to make demands and get them satisfied. In the two big cities, Rio de Janeiro and Sao

Paulo, the minimum wage is 21,000 cruzieros per month. Work time is limited to eight hours in any one day, half a day off on Saturday and a free day in each seven, usually Sunday. This is the minimum for the two big cities. In smaller cities the minimum wage is lower. In the countryside it gets down to 7,000 cruzieros per month. This is little enough, but it is a minimum which we will raise as we increase production.

"At the other end of the scale—well, there is no limit. With present-day inflation the clever, the shrewd, and the greedy are making millions and even billions in land speculation, stock manipulation, labor exploitation, and in robbery (by some of those on the inside) of the public treasury.

"We know that the poor get too little and the rich too much. We also know that in the 400 years of Brazil's recent history there has never been a time when so many of her boys and girls were growing up in good health, fairly well educated, and with the prospect of steady work at minimum pay as well as leisure in which to enjoy life. If they feel so inclined, and will utilize their opportunities, they can rise to the top.

"Where do we go from here? Do we follow the well-paved road laid by United States private enterprisers? Most of us think not.

"Do we take the path blazed by the Soviet Union? China? Cuba? We are wondering and, at the moment, hesitating. We believe that socialism is the next stage in social advance; but no one feels sure yet of the 'how,' still less of the 'when.'

"One thing is sure," our Brazilian economist friend concluded, "we are on our way from colonialism to socialism, with little more than a nod to free-enterprise capitalism as we pass it by. The future is ours if we can shape it in accord with our purposes and aspirations."

Another Bursting Megalopolis

Citizens boast that Sao Paulo, Brazil, is "the fastest growing city in the world." To prove it they cite population figures: half a million in 1890, a million in 1925; two million in 1945, and almost four millions in 1960. Actually, the population growth of Los Angeles has been more rapid: 1890, 50,000; 1920, 576,000; 1940, 1,504,000; 1960, 2,476,000—or about fifty-

fold in the past 70 years, compared with Sao Paulo's eight-fold over the same period. In the last thirty years the growth rates in some of the new cities of Soviet Asia have exceeded that of Los Angeles, and in the past ten years some of the new industrial centers in China have had even more spectacular population explosions. If the Paulistas want to be on safe ground they will limit themselves to saying that their city is the largest in South America and the most important center of industry, commerce, and finance on that continent.

Sao Paulo is spread over an immense territory. Also it is growing skyward at a prodigious rate. From daylight to sundown, building trades workers are transforming the city center. Buildings of five to ten floors are being torn down and replaced by structures of twenty or more stories. Like every free-enterprise city, general planning in Sao Paulo is limited to zone restrictions and regulations concerning health and safety. The new structures are built of reinforced concrete, floor above floor. Glass is being used extensively. Moving stairways are replacing elevators in some of the lower buildings. There are large building complexes under way. But there is no overall plan. Each new project has its own reason for being but has failed to consult with its neighbors. The result is an irritating jumpy skyline and a jammed-up city center.

Paulistas have missed their chance to re-plan and to rebuild a whole city, from center to circumference. They have also failed to discriminate. What does one need at the center of a great city? Banks? It is impossible to eat at banks or to live in them. Open for a few hours in the middle of the day for five days a week, most of the time they are empty shells tended by janitors and guarded by special police. Yet the entire center of Sao Paulo is studded with banks. On all of the main streets, wherever one turns, there are banks. Banks occupy the city's corner lots.

Priorities which make central Sao Paulo for the most part a city of usually empty, ill-assorted bank buildings, jostling one another for position and attention, rest on a solid economic foundation. Banks have the money, so they are able to buy the corner lots. They have the money because Sao Paulo, like its contemporaries all over the capitalist world, has been built on credit. Banks provide the credit—for a consideration. The interest on

these credit instruments—bonds and mortgages—is paid for ten, twenty, forty years, even beyond the life of the building.

Banks have taken over, and Sao Paulo has become a banker's dream of paradise—business hours 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. and rents rolling in twenty-four hours of every day from stores on the street level and office space overhead. Banks mean more floors, more office spaces, more rent for the bankers and more sales for merchants.

But the Paulista grabbers have overlooked several bets. First, they have failed to provide means of getting customers into the city center and back again to the suburbs. Speaking generally, Sao Paulo has a generous bus service. Actually, the main traffic arteries are crowded with buses. Yet in the late afternoon, when the rush of workers from center to suburbs begins, the supply of buses falls far short of demand. Long lines form at designated bus stops around Independence Square, lines stretching halfway around the block. I counted one line that was made up of 130 people. It was not exceptional.

Sao Paulo has missed a second bet in its race to be the fastest growing city. There are bumper-to-bumper traffic jams all over the city center. These jams begin early in the morning and last until early evening as buses, trucks, passenger cars, and an occasional horse-drawn vehicle jostle and maneuver for right of way. There are many traffic police, youngish and personable. I never saw traffic police more considerate, affable, and anxious to please; but traffic police cannot move solid lines of traffic until the lights turn.

Parking? There are no places to park. Truck and car drivers vie with each other every time a car leaves a curb. There are just not enough parking spots to meet half of the ceaseless demand.

Some of the city streets are being widened. That helps. But all over the city center the crowds on the sidewalks are so dense that foot passengers stream off the sidewalks into the streets, putting another obstacle in the way of congested vehicle traffic.

Sao Paulo, with its over-supply of slightly used bank buildings, has missed a third bet. All over the world, people in the older cities are moving out to congregate around local shopping

centers. A hundred years ago (even fifty years ago) the frenzied rush of Paulistas to the center might have contained some grains of sense. Experience in recent years has convinced peoples over most of the world (consumers, merchants, purveyors of credit, professional people, and workers) that life is more rewarding on the circumference, with an occasional trip to the metropolitan center.

We have heard that Brazil has the largest river in the world. In California a well-placed sign announces "the smallest river in the world." These challenges are quite harmless. But "the fastest growing city in the world"? Have a care, Sao Paulo. Your breeches already are bursting at the seams.

"Whatever Goes Down—"

There is an old saying that whatever goes up is sure to come down. President Kennedy evidently believes that the reverse is also true: that whatever goes down is sure to come up. At his press conference on March 6th Mr. Kennedy was asked about the national outlook. Said the questioner: "Your policies in Europe seem to be encountering great difficulties. Cuba continues to be a problem. At home unemployment is high. There seems to be more concern in the country over a budget deficit than for a tax cut." Does this mean, the questioner continued, that your administration has lost its momentum?

President Kennedy answered, reflectively: "There is a rhythm to a personal and national and international life, and it flows and ebbs. . . . If you ask me whether this was the winter of our discontent, I would say no. If you would ask me whether we were quite as well this winter as we were doing in the fall, I would say no."

This answer assumes that the ebb, or period of stagnation in which United States economy and society find themselves, will be followed in the same uninterrupted rhythm by a period of flooding expansion. Experience contradicts the assumption. Personal life flows and ebbs over a certain period, the life span. National life follows a similar pattern. The grandfathers of to-day will not be with us tomorrow. The nations of the past—"Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, where are they?"

Surely the President knows that the Rome of Augustus

Caesar was burned out by war and swallowed up by excessive taxation, land monopoly, the immense overhead of economic and social parasitism, the grinding wastes of exploitation, and the mounting burden of inflation, slave revolts, and civil wars.

Does the President assume that the ebb from Britain's Victoria Jubilee in 1897, when the Union Jack ruled the seven seas, will be followed by a flooding return of British 19th-century world power? If such a flood is to occur, Britain must have food, shelter, oil, coal, iron, copper, tin. Many of these resources she possessed, once upon a time. Today they are exhausted in the British Isles. Britain imports her necessities at high cost.

The same resources are being rapidly exhausted in the United States. Were it not for the oil, iron, copper, tin, and food products of Latin America, made available by cheap mass labor, the United States would already be on the same skids that provided a quick exit for Rome and Britain. In all three cases, resource exhaustion, exploitation, deficit, debt, rising overhead costs, inflation, and the heavy outlays involved in the defense of planet-wide investments and commitments ruined the economies and played havoc with the normal rhythm of personal and national life.

Like causes lead to like results in economic and social relations as they do in logic, mathematics, physics, and agriculture.

Rome built a world empire on a private-enterprise economy and a competitive society. Britain did the same. Both flunked out when the costs of privateering, competition, and the consequent monopoly exceeded the benefits.

The President may be a dutiful son and have a winning personality, but under his administration those who want apples must plant apple trees, and no matter how many citizens vote for a presidential candidate, water still runs down hill, and what goes down does not necessarily come up again.

This is an issue we must face. . . . The world is going to change. No power on earth can stop it, short of destroying all humanity. The choice before us is, therefore, peaceful change or change brought about by force. No international organization, however powerful, can stop the clock of history.

—*Dr. Nkrumah*

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

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We have another book in the works—*Marxism For Our Time*, by Gilles Martinet, editor of the French weekly *France Observateur*—but it is not yet far enough along to enable us to estimate costs and hence to fix a price. We anticipate a fall publication date.

In addition to the foregoing books, MR Press will soon publish a pamphlet entitled *The War in Vietnam* by Hugh Deane, whom many MR readers will remember for his perceptive reporting on Asia in *The Compass* during the early 1950's. This price will be 50¢ a copy, \$2 for 5 copies, \$5 for 13 copies. Orders acceptable immediately.

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One further piece of pamphlet news: Konni Zilliacus, left-wing Labor M.P., has written what we regard as an absolutely first-rate pamphlet entitled *Our Lives and Cuba: What Britain Must Do to Survive*. Believing that many MR readers will want to have this, we have ordered a batch from the publisher in London and will sell them at 25¢ a copy on a first-come-first-served basis.

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